Elsevier

Critical Care Clinics

Volume 19, Issue 2, April 2003, Pages 279-313
Critical Care Clinics

Bioterrorism and critical care

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-0704(02)00053-2Get rights and content

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Potential biologic agents

The strategic planning workgroup of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has categorized biologic agents that might be used in a bioterrorist attack into three groups, A, B, and C. This grouping is based on an agent's potential for disturbing the public health and its infrastructure. Factors influencing the categorization are capability to cause illness or death, stability of the agent, ease of delivery, ease of mass production, person-to-person transmissibility, potential for

Distinguishing between a natural epidemic and a biologic attack

Recognition of a bioterrorist attack requires prompt identification based on typical clinical syndromes, because laboratory confirmation of these otherwise rare illnesses may be delayed. In addition there are certain epidemiologic features peculiar to a bioterrorist attack that help distinguish it from a natural outbreak of disease [16], [17]:

  • A rapid rise and fall of the epidemic curve over a short period of time (few hours to days)

  • A steady rise in cases instead of the peaks and troughs seen in

Delivery of the agent

Delivery of a biologic weapon is most likely to be by an aerosol spray or cloud, because of the greater absorption surface area of the alveolar bed. This delivery method would require an agent to be aerosolized into droplets or particles 1 to 5 μm in diameter to reach and be absorbed by the alveolar bed. Particles larger than 5 to 10 μm would be filtered out by or deposited into the upper respiratory tract. However, Many viruses (influenza, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and smallpox) can be

Other category B agents

Discussion of all the possible biologic weapons is beyond the scope of this article. Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB toxin), viral equine encephalitides, and ricin toxin deserve attention, because they have been weaponized. Furthermore, they can all present as an upper respiratory viral illness, making differentiation of biologic attack from a natural viral epidemic difficult (see Table 1).

Q fever is a zoonotic disease of herded animals. Humans acquire it through

Summary

A bioterrorist attack of any kind has the potential to overwhelm a community and, indeed, in the case of smallpox, an entire nation. During such an attack the number of patients requiring hospitalization and specifically critical care is likely to be enormous. Intensivists will be at the forefront of this war and will play an important role in dealing with mass casualties in an attempt to heal the community. A high degree of suspicion and prompt recognition of an event will be required to

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