Bioterrorism and critical care
Section snippets
Potential biologic agents
The strategic planning workgroup of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has categorized biologic agents that might be used in a bioterrorist attack into three groups, A, B, and C. This grouping is based on an agent's potential for disturbing the public health and its infrastructure. Factors influencing the categorization are capability to cause illness or death, stability of the agent, ease of delivery, ease of mass production, person-to-person transmissibility, potential for
Distinguishing between a natural epidemic and a biologic attack
Recognition of a bioterrorist attack requires prompt identification based on typical clinical syndromes, because laboratory confirmation of these otherwise rare illnesses may be delayed. In addition there are certain epidemiologic features peculiar to a bioterrorist attack that help distinguish it from a natural outbreak of disease [16], [17]:
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A rapid rise and fall of the epidemic curve over a short period of time (few hours to days)
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A steady rise in cases instead of the peaks and troughs seen in
Delivery of the agent
Delivery of a biologic weapon is most likely to be by an aerosol spray or cloud, because of the greater absorption surface area of the alveolar bed. This delivery method would require an agent to be aerosolized into droplets or particles 1 to 5 μm in diameter to reach and be absorbed by the alveolar bed. Particles larger than 5 to 10 μm would be filtered out by or deposited into the upper respiratory tract. However, Many viruses (influenza, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and smallpox) can be
Other category B agents
Discussion of all the possible biologic weapons is beyond the scope of this article. Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB toxin), viral equine encephalitides, and ricin toxin deserve attention, because they have been weaponized. Furthermore, they can all present as an upper respiratory viral illness, making differentiation of biologic attack from a natural viral epidemic difficult (see Table 1).
Q fever is a zoonotic disease of herded animals. Humans acquire it through
Summary
A bioterrorist attack of any kind has the potential to overwhelm a community and, indeed, in the case of smallpox, an entire nation. During such an attack the number of patients requiring hospitalization and specifically critical care is likely to be enormous. Intensivists will be at the forefront of this war and will play an important role in dealing with mass casualties in an attempt to heal the community. A high degree of suspicion and prompt recognition of an event will be required to
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Biowarfare and Bioterrorism
2013, Critical Care ClinicsCitation Excerpt :However, we are often left with trying to distinguish between a naturally occurring event (epidemic) and an intentional event (bioterrorism). It can be difficult to distinguish between an artificial incident (terrorism) and a natural occurrence (epidemic).47,48 Box 5 lists some of the characteristics that might help distinguish between the 2 events based on epidemiologic features.
Mechanical Ventilation in an Airborne Epidemic
2008, Clinics in Chest MedicineAn immunoaffinity tandem mass spectrometry (iMALDI) assay for detection of Francisella tularensis
2007, Analytica Chimica ActaCitation Excerpt :Humans who have direct physical contact with infected animals or insects, or have inhaled aerosolized bacteria, have a good chance of becoming infected. Untreated, the mortality rate can be 30% [6]. Initial non-specific flu-like symptoms usually appear 3 days after exposure [7], and general laboratory tests (CRP, LDH, alkaline phosphatase, leukocytes, etc.) are insufficient for diagnosis.
Organization-based Incident Management: Developing a Disaster Volunteer Role on a University Campus
2007, Disaster Management and ResponseCitation Excerpt :The “Ready, Willing, and Able Act” (H.R.3565—109th Congress, 1st Session)2 has provided insight into defining readiness and preparedness for terrorism through the eyes of the public, while emphasizing the need to increase public participation in community-based disaster planning efforts. There is a growing body of literature documenting the desire of individuals to provide meaningful services during disasters.3,4 Evidence exists that volunteers can play an important role in the development and achievement of emergency management: goals related to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.5,6
Radiology of Biological Weapons-Old and the New?
2007, Seminars in RoentgenologyCitation Excerpt :Naturally occurring disease can be acquired by bites from infected ticks or flies, by consumption of contaminated water, or via inhalation. Since the infection may be transmitted with as little as 10 to 50 organisms, tularemia was perceived as a potential bioweapon28 and both the US and the Soviet Union experimented with the delivery of aerosolized F. tularensis.29 Among naturally occurring infections, the ulceroglandular form of tularemia is the most common presentation, characterized by a cutaneous ulcer accompanied by regional adenopathy.
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers: Current Status of Endemic Disease and Strategies for Control
2006, Infectious Disease Clinics of North AmericaCitation Excerpt :Other laboratory abnormalities include lymphocytopenia and thrombocytopenia that peaks between 10 and 11 days [89]. For prophylaxis and treatment of Lassa fever including pregnant women [14,16,17,84,87,95], high-dose intravenous ribavirin is recommended, 2 g intravenous loading dose followed by 1 g intravenously every 6 hours for 4 days. This is followed by 0.5 g intravenously every 8 hours for 6 days.